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ABSTRACT
The central theme of this paper is that international linkages between
.
national economies influence, in fundamentally important ways, ~e effective-
ness and proper conduct of national macroeconomic policies. Specifically,
this paper summarizes the implications for the conduct of macroeconomic
policies in open economies of both the traditional approach to open economy
macroeconomics and of more recent developments. As recent experience demon-
strates, no country is immune from disturbances originating in the rest of
the world and no government can sensibly conduct its macroeconomic policy on
the assumption that it operates in a closed economy. National economies are
linked not only through the mechanism of tile Keynesian foreign-trade multiplier
but also through the complex of linkages implied by commodity trade, capital
mobility and the exchange of national monies. These linkages are not proper-
ties of a particular model but implications of parity conditions and equilibrium
requirements in goods and asset markets, income and balance sheets constraints,
the absence of long-run money illusion, and consistency of expectations which
impose important constraints on the conduct of macroeconomic policy in an
open economy.
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The central theme of this paper is that international linkages between
national economies influence, in fundamentally important ways, the effective-
ness and proper conduct of national macroeconomic policies. Specifically, our
purpose is to summarize the implications for the conduct of macroeconumic
policies in open economies of both the traditional approach to open economy
macroeconomics (as developed largely by James E. Meade, Robert A. Mundell and
J. Marcus Fleming) and of more recent developments. ·Our discussion is organized
around three key linkages between national economies: through commodity trade,
through capital mobility, and through exchange of national monies. These link-
ages have important implications concerning the effects of macroeconomic policies
in open economies that differ from the effects of such pOlicies in closed economies.
Recent developments in the theory of macroeconomic policy have estab-
lished conditions for the effectiveness of policies in influencing output
and employment which emphasize the distinctionbetw~enanticipated and unan-
ticipated policy actions, the importance of incomplete information, and the
consequences of contracts that fix nominal wages and prices over finite inter-
vals. In this paper, we shall not analyze how these conditions are modified
in an open economy. However, since our concern is with macroeconomic policy,
a principal objective of which is to influence output and employment, we shall
assume that requisite conditions for such influence are satisfied.
I. Commodity Market Linkages
International trade links the prices of goods produced and consumed in
different national economies. This linkage has at least three implications for
the conduct of macroeconomic policy in open economies.
First, according to the principle of purchasing power parity, the price
level in one country (in terms of domestic money) should equal the price level
in a foreign country (in terms of foreign money) multiplied by the exchange
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rate between domestic money and foreign money. Because of transport costs,
trade barriers, -different weighting schemes for price indices and changes in
relative prices of non-traded goods, this link is not rigid; but the evidence
indicates that this principle holds fairly well over long time periods (though
it has weakened during the 1970s). The key implication of purchasing power
parity is that a country cannot choose its long-run inflation rate independently
of its long-run monetary policy and the long-run behavior of its exchange rate.
A country, particularly a small country, that fixes the exchange rate between
its domestic money and the money of some fore1gn country will experience a
domestic inflation rate and a domestic rate of monetary expansion that are
strongly influenced by the monetary policy of that foreign country. This is so
even if changes in real economic conditions (which are largely independent of
domestic monetary policy) induce divergences from strict purchasing power parity.
Second, the world monetary system and the conduct of national monetary
policies must allow for changes in equilibrium ,relationships between national
price levels induced by changes in relative prices of internationally traded
goods and of non-tradable goods. To maintain a system of fixed exchange rates,
changes in equilibrium relationships among national price levels must be accom-
modated by differentials among national inflation rates, supported by appropriate
national economic policies. Under a system of controlled or managed floating,
it is essential that countries either allow their inflation rates or the rates
of change of exchange rates to accommodate equilibrium changes in relative
national price levels. A rule that links changes in the exchange rates rigidly
to changes in domestic and foreign prices, in accord with relative purchasing
power parity, is not consistent with this requirement.
Third, macroeconomic policy can do little to offset changes in equilibrium
levels of real income resulting from changes in relative prices of internationally
traded goods. A case in point is the: recent increase in the relative price of3
oil. Monetary policy can influence the extent to which the increase in the
relative price of oil affects general price levels and perhaps short-run
levels of employment in oil exporting and oil importing countries. Tax and
expenditure policy can affect the extent to which gains and losses of real
income are translated into changes in real expenditure, or are financed by
changes in foreign lending and borrowing. By influencing the level and dis-
~
tribution of real expenditure, fiscal policy can also affect the relative
prices of non-tradable commodities and the distribution of the change in real
national income among individuals within the economy. However, neither monetary
nor fiscal policy can alter to any appreciable extent the average change in the
long-run level of real expenditure resulting from a change in the relative
prices of internationally traded commodities that are beyond the control of
national economic policies.
lIe Capital Market Linkages
International capital mobility links interest rates on financial assets
denominated in different national monies through the interest parity relation-
ship. This relationship requires that interest differentials betwedn securities
denominated in different currencies equal the forward discount or premium on
foreign exchange. The empirical evidence indicates that this relationship
holds almost exactly for easily tradable securities identical i~ all respects
except currency of denomination" but somewhat less well for assets exchanged
primarily in national credit markets (see Robert Z. Aliber, Michael Dooley and
Peter Isard, and Jacob A. Frenkel and Richard M v Levich). International capital
mobility also allows countries to finance imbalances in their current accounts
and thus provides an important channel for the international transmission of
macroeconomic disturbances. The linkage of interest rates through interest
parity and the transmission of macroeconomic disturbances through international4
capital flows have significant implications for thp. conduct of macroeconomic
policy in open economies.
International capital mobility imposes a severe constraint on the use of
monetary policy for domestic stabilization purposes. Under a fixed exchange
rate, an increase in the domes~ic credit com~onent of the money supply in a
small open economy may temporarily reduce interest rates on domestic securitie~,
but it will induce a capital outflow and a corresponding loss of foreign ex-
change reserves that will rapidly reduce the money supply back to its previous
equilibrium level. Monetary expansion by a large country, which affects con-
ditions in world financial markets, can be somewhat more effective in influ-
encing domestic prices, out~ut and employment. However, even a large country
will suffer a loss of foreign exchange reserves that is inversely related to its
size in the world economy. Sterilization operations of a central bank may
temporarily insulate the domestic money supply from changes in foreign exchange
reserves; but, in the long run, sterilization cannot sustain ,a money supply
that differs from the equilibrium level of money demand. Under a f~exible ex-
change rate, a government regains long-run control over the nominal money supply.
However, international capital mobility still limits the effectiveness of mone-
tary policy: Any increase in aggregate demand induced by lower domestic interest
rates is partially dissipated in ~ncreased expenditures on imported goods,
financed by international capital fluws; and exchange rate adjustments that
occur rapidly in response to perceived changes in monetary policy are likely to
leaq to rapid adjustments of domestic prices and wage.rates, thereby limiting
the effect of monetary policy on output and employment.
A high degree of capital mobility also implies a low degree of effective-
ness of fiscal policy. Under a flexible exchange rate, a fixed domestic money
supply and a domestic interest rate fixed by condi~ions in world markets (and
by exchange rate expectations which affect the forward discount or premium on,.
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foreign exchange) impose a strict constraint on the level of domestic income
that is consistent with monetary equilibrium. Fiscal policy actions do not
affect this constraint (except possibly by altering exchange rate expectations)
and, hence, cannot affect the equilibrium level of domestic income. Under a
fixed exchange rate, the money supply is not fixed because the capital inflow
induced by an expansionary fiscal poLicy will increase the foreign exchange re-
serves of the monetary authority. The initial expansionary effect of any fiscal
stimulus, however, is limited by the extent to which it falls on domestically
produced goods that are not close substi~utes for imports; and the subsequ~nt
multiplier effects of any fiscal stimulus are limited by the high marginal
propensity to spend on internationally traded goods.
To achieve the maximum effect from fiscal and monetary policy in open
economies, it follows that such policies should be directed toward goods and
assets that are isolated from world trade, that is, toward goods and assets for
which the home country is "large" relative to the size of the market. Changes
in government expenditures on non-tradable goods are likely to be mure effective
in influencing domestic output and employment than changes in government expendi-
ture on internationally traded goods. Similarly, open market operations in-
volving financial assets that are not close substitutes for international
financial assets are more likely to influence intere~t rates and thus other
macroeconomic variables [see Rudiger Dornbusch, William Branson and
Russell Boyer]. This does not imply, however, that it is desirable to artifi-
cially restrict trade and capital movements in order to enhance the effectiveness
of macroeconomic policy. Such restrictions have an important cost in terms of
reducing the benefits that a country derives from integration of markets. More-
over, substi~utionpossibilities among goods and among financial assets limit
the effectiveness of restrictions,on trade and capital movements. As many policy-
makers have discovered, using macroeconomic policy for dom~stic stabilization
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Objectives in an open economy is like trying to heat a house when the doors and
windows are open and th~ cold wind is blowing.
Finally, international capital mobility implies that current account
imbalances can be financed by capital movements, independent of the government's
willingness to allow cha~ges in its foreign exchange reserves. Hence, with
capital mobility, the current account which measures both the net contribution
of the foreign sector to aggregate demand for domestically produced goods and
the change in a country's net debtor position, is always a concern of macro-
economic policy, regardless of the exchange rate regime. As emphasized by the
absorption approach to the balance of payments [see Sidney Alexander and Harry
G. Johnson (1958)], the current account is equal to the excess of national in-
come over national expenditure. It follows that the policies required to bring
about an improvement in the current account are not primarily commercial policies
that affect the domestic relative prices of imported goods, but monetary and
especially fiscal policies that stimulate private saving and that reduce the
government's own excess of spending over income.
III. Monetary Linkages
The concept of monetary equilibrium as requiring equality between the
demand and supply of money, is a basic ingredient in both closed and open
economy macroeconomic theory. It implies that any change in the supply of
money or any exogenous disturbance to money demand must lead to changes in
the equilibrium values of one or more of the variables that inf.luence money
demand. It also implies that any disturbance or policy action that does not
directly affect the demand or supply of money must, in equilibrium, lead to
offsetting changes in the variables that'inf1uenc~ money demand that are con-
sistent with a constant level of that demand.
The implications of monetary equilibLium for the macroeconomic policy7
of an open economy operating under a fixed exchange rate are reflected in the
principles of the monetary approach to the balance of payments [see Michael
Mussa (1974) and the articles in Frenkel and Johnson (1976)]. Specifically,
the use of monetary policy for domestic stabilization purposes is constrained
by the equilibrium level of the demand for money which io largely beyond th~
control of the monetary authority. An expansion of the domestic credit component
of the money supply may temporarily raise prices (especially of non-traded goods),
raise output (especially in industries with sticky wages and prices), and reduce
interest rates (especially for domestic securities sheltered from world finan-
cia1 markets). In the longer run, however, the direct effect of monetary ex-
pansion on desired spending and on desired portfolio reallocations, and the in-
direct effects of changes in prices and interest rates will induce deficits in
the current and capital accounts of the balance of payments. H;.nce the foreign
exchange reserve component of the money supply will decline until the money
supply is reduced to the long-run equilibrium level of money demand. For a
large country, the long-run equilibrium level of money demand may be influenced
by the effect of domestic monetary expansion on the world price level. However,
except for a reserve currency country, whose national money is accepted as a
foreign exchange reserve by other countries; the principal long-run effect of
monetary policy will be on the composition of assets on the central bank's
balance sheet rather than on the magnitude of its monetary liabilities. Further,
other economic policies affect a country's foreign exchange reserves (and hence
its cumulative official settlements balance) only ~o the extent that they aff~ct
the demand to hold domestic money. For example, an import tariff can induce a
once-and-for-a11 increase in the level of reserves to the extent that it in-
creases the domestic price level and thus the demand to hold domestic money.
But, it cannot induce a continuing inflow of foreign exchange reserves by
reducing imports relative to exports [see Mussa (1974)].
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The requirements of monetary equilibrium also constrain economic policy
under a flexible exchange rate. A flexible exchange rate is not an additional
policy tool that can be manipulated by the government, but rather an endogenous
variable that is determined by market forces which are influenced by the actual
and expected conduct of fiscal and, especially, monetary policy. In particular,
from the homogeneity postulate, it follows that, other things constant, in the
long run, changes in the nominal money supply will lead to proportionate changes
in all nominal prices, including the price of foreign exchange. This is one of
the fundamental tenets of the monetary approach to exchang~ rates [see Frenkel
and Johnson (1978)].
Other important implications of this approach follow from the essential
dynamic linkage between current exchange rates and expectations of future ex-
change rates implied by international mobility of financial assets denominated
. . f . 1 . 1 1n d1f erent nat10na mon1es. First, since future government policies will
influence future exchange rates, it follows that expectations concerning future
policies should influence current exchange rates. Hence, the effect of any
particular policy action on exchange rates (and through exchange rates on other
macroeconomic variables) will depend on its effect on expectations concerning
future policy actions. Second, the sensitivity of exchange rates to expectations
of future policy implies that the traditional approach to macroeconomic policy
analysis, which views policy as iso~ated actions in response to particular
circumstances, is inappropriate. Instead, it is necessary to analyze the general
framework ofgovernrnent policy, within which the effect of any particular action
depends on the public's perception of the implications of that action for the
future conduct of policy. Third, since exchange rates respond quickly to new
information about events likely to affect foreign exchange markets, exchange
rate adjustments are an important channel for rapid transmission of macroeconomic
disturbances and of government policies. In particular, new information that leads9
to the expectation of a higher rate of inflation is likely to induce an immedi-
ate depreciation of the foreign exChange value of domestic money which will be
rapidly translated into increased domestic prices of internationally traded
commodities. In addition, exchange rate depreciation may serve as a ~ignal
for upward adjustments in the prices of domestic goods and in wage rates.
Fourth, if there is short-run stickiness ~f prices of domestic goods in terms
of national monies, then rapid exChange rate adjustments will induce changes
in the relative prices of different national outputs. Such relative price
changes are a desirable response to changing real economic conditions requiring
adjustments of relative prices; and a flexible exchange rate regime may have
an important advantage in facilitating such adjustments. However, unnecessary
changes in relative prices in respol1se to purely monetary disturbances may have
significant social costs that can be avoided or reduced by pursuing monetary
policies that are not themselves an independent source of monetary disturbances
and that offset, as much as possible, exogenous fluctuations in money demands.
Fifth, official intervention in foreign exchange markets, which alters only
the supplies of non-monetary assets available to the public, may have a limited
influence on exChange rates through portfolio balance effects. In aadition,
such intervention may have a more powerful effect on exchange rates by signal-
ling to the public the intentions of governments concerning future policies.
Finally, exchange rates may be useful as an indicator for monetary policy -
directed at offsetting fluctuations in money demand, especially when rapidly
Changing inflationary expectations maAe nominal interest rates an unreliable
indicator of fluctuations in money demand. For example, the combination of
rising nominal interest rates anu appreciation of the foreign exchange value
of domestic money would probably indicate an increase in the demand for domestic
money that should be accommodated by an increase in supply; whereas the co~
bination of rising interest rates and depreciation would probably indicate an10
acceleration of inflationary expectations that should not be fueled by an
accommodative monetary policy.
IV. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have discussed the implications of "openness" of an
economy for the effectiveness and appropriate conduct of macroeconomic poli-
cies. As recent experience demonstrates, no country is immune from distur-
bances originating in the rest of the world and no government can sensibly
conduct its macroeconomic policy on the assumption that it operates in a
closed economy. National economies are linked not only through the mechanism
of the Keynesian foreign-trade multiplier but also through the complex of
linkages implied by commodity trade, capital mobility and the exchange of
national monies. These linkages are not properties of a par~icular model but
implications of parity conditions and equilibrium requirements in goods and
asset markets, income and balance sheets constraints, the absence of long-
run money illusion, and consistency of expectations which impose important
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